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Introduction

Easing Labor Market Troubles in the
Short Run and Developing a Skilled
Workforce in the Long Run: Some Ideas

S

ome commentators suggested
in late 2008 and early 2009 that the
worldwide economic crisis we were
going through might spin out of control
and result in another Great Depression.
Whether such dire predictions will
become true is unknown. But we do
know that through the middle of 2009
we are still in the midst of the longest
recession since the Great Depression.
The unemployment rate has risen to
9.5 percent; the underemployment rate
has reached 16.5 percent. The average
unemployment duration has risen to 24.5
weeks—the longest duration recorded
since the government began tracking
it in 1948. Since the beginning of the
recession, more than 6.5 million net jobs
have been lost, which is approximately
equal to the net job gain over the
previous nine years. This is the only
recession since the Great Depression to
have wiped out all of the job growth from
the previous business cycle.
The Upjohn Institute was born out
of the throes of the Great Depression.
A very practical but very innovative
individual, Dr. W. E. Upjohn of
Kalamazoo, a physician and founder of
the Upjohn Drug Company, promoted
the idea that devising innovative,
local solutions through community
collaboration was the best way to
overcome the drastic consequences

of the Great Depression—widespread
unemployment and poverty. In 1932,
he established the W.E. Upjohn Trustee
Corporation, the forerunner to the
W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment
Research.
The mission of the Upjohn Institute
is to “find and promote solutions to
employment-related problems.” In
keeping with that spirit, this issue of
Employment Research presents findings
and recommendations from recent
research conducted by the Institute’s
senior economists and coauthors. Their
suggestions are offered for consideration
in improving U.S. labor market policy.
Some recommendations focus on
existing programs; others call for new
or redirected policies or programs.
Some focus on the supply side of the
markets; others focus on labor demand.
The unifying theme of the articles is
that the silver lining in the clouds that
have darkened the labor market may be
the opportunity to implement improved
administrative procedures in current
programs and to introduce innovative
policies and new programs.
Our national policy toward
unemployment and the labor market
might be characterized as having three
prongs. In 1933, with the passage of the
Wagner-Peyser Act, we established a
national network of public employment
offices under the U.S. Employment
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Service. In 1935, the Unemployment
Insurance (UI) program was instituted
to insure workers against the risk of
unavoidable job loss. Finally, in 1962,
the Manpower Development and
Training Act (MDTA) initiated support
at the national level for job training. For
unemployed individuals, unemployment
compensation partially replaces earnings
losses, and services provided by the
Employment Service and the Workforce
Investment Act (ultimate successor to
MDTA) actively promote reemployment.
Less recognized in the current
recession than the failures in the financial
and automobile manufacturing sectors
and the bursting of the housing bubble
is the steady deterioration during recent
years of the infrastructure that supports
the three-pronged labor market policy.
Initiatives instituted in the 1990s and
intended to strengthen the system have
languished. One-stop career centers were
an effort to consolidate and integrate
the UI and reemployment services to
better serve workers and employers.
However, administrative funding has
been significantly reduced, and the
number of one-stop agencies has actually
gone down, from about 3,600 at the
end of 2003 to fewer than 3,000 at the
end of 2008. The Worker Profiling and
Reemployment Services (WPRS) system
was instituted in 1994 with the intent
of targeting reemployment services to
individuals most likely to exhaust their
UI benefits. All states developed this
system, but administrative funding lagged
and the U.S. Government Accountability
Office (2007) found that states were
not providing in-depth reemployment
services as recommended. Although the
original Wagner-Peyser statute requires
the U.S. Employment Service to be
housed in the Department of Labor, in
the last few years it has been downgraded
and is now subsumed within an adult
services division with no separate
administrator. Job development activities
within the Employment Service and the
Workforce Investment Act agencies have
been curtailed. Many other significant
diminutions of our infrastructure can be
pointed out.
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The first two articles focus on demand
side suggestions aimed at reducing
the current recessionary levels of
unemployment. The first of these articles
argues that promoting and expanding
the short-time compensation feature
of unemployment insurance would
reduce the use of and the system bias
toward layoffs. Next, we suggest that
during recessions, reinstituting a revised
New Jobs Tax Credit (NJTC) may be a
cost-effective way to increase overall
employment. Such a revised NJTC would
provide tax relief to employers that make
net additions to their employment.

Less recognized in the current
recession than the failures in
the financial and automobile
manufacturing sectors and the
bursting of the housing bubble is
the steady deterioration during
recent years of the infrastructure
that supports the three-pronged
labor market policy.
Recognizing that the American
Reinvestment and Recovery Act of 2009
reinvests considerable resources back into
the infrastructure and activities of the UI
Service, the Employment Service, and the
Workforce Investment Act, the next two
articles in our newsletter suggest that the
administration of these programs can be
improved by using local macroeconomic
data to adjust performance standards and
by using software tools to direct clients to
appropriate services and careers.
The second half of the newsletter
contains articles about enduring policy or
program initiatives that would improve
labor market outcomes, whether or
not the economy is in recession. The
persistent labor market problems of
disadvantaged workers may be addressed
by a selective wage subsidy, according
to the first of these articles. A permanent
version of a wage subsidy program that
was temporarily instituted in Minnesota
is suggested as an incentive that, at
reasonable cost, could have a substantial
impact on the employment rates of
disadvantaged groups of workers.

Next, the newsletter addresses
the longer-term issue of developing
a competitive workforce through
educational reform. We first suggest
that universal, high-quality preschool
programs for four-year-olds will have
substantial benefit-to-cost payoffs in
the long run. Per dollar spent, such
programs will increase the present value
of earnings by $4. Focusing on education
that is pursued by older students, the next
article articulates a concern that career
and technical education may get harmed
in the nation’s zeal to improve scores on
standardized tests for mathematics and
language arts. It suggests that up-to-date,
rigorous, employer-driven career and
technical education is complementary
to the goal of improved academic
performance, not a barrier to it.
Circling back to Dr. Upjohn’s
premise that localities may be bestsuited to mitigate the dire impacts of
recessionary unemployment, the final
two articles of our July newsletter
focus on communities. The penultimate
article addresses the question of
how communities can respond to the
economic downturn. The final article
considers the Kalamazoo Promise, a
unique but quickly spreading concept in
which private donors in the community
have instituted a program (the first of its
kind when announced in 2005) aimed
at expanding access to postsecondary
education and growing the region’s
economy. The article considers the
significant economic benefits that would
be gained throughout the country by
reducing the financial (and perceptual)
barriers to the access of postsecondary
education through the expansion of
programs like the Kalamazoo Promise.
Reference
U.S. Government Accountability
Office. 2007. Unemployment Insurance:
More Guidance and Evaluation of
Worker-Profiling Initiative Could
Help Improve State Efforts. Report to
Congressional Requesters. GAO-07680. Washington, DC: U.S. Government
Accountability Office.
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Katharine G. Abraham and Susan N. Houseman

Short-Time Compensation
Is a Missing Safety Net for
U.S. Economy in Recessions
A

t the G20 meeting in London in
March, President Obama urged other
countries to follow the United States’ lead
in pursuing aggressive federal stimulus
policies. Continental Europeans—most
notably the Germans and French—
balked, arguing that their generous
systems of social insurance already
perform as automatic stabilizers during
recessionary times such as the present.
An important part of the social safety
net in Germany, France, and a number of
other European countries is short-time
compensation, which provides prorated unemployment benefits to workers
whose hours have been reduced and
thereby helps companies avoid layoffs.
Short-time compensation—also known
as work-sharing benefits—is available
in only 17 U.S. states and is little used
in the majority of states with such
programs. The absence of STC benefits is
a significant gap in U.S. social insurance
policy that should be plugged.
By fostering work-sharing in lieu
of layoffs, STC benefits can help firms
make needed workforce adjustments
in a more efficient and equitable way.
Companies that implement work-sharing
arrangements can avoid the loss of valued
employees during a temporary downturn.
Work-sharing is more equitable because
the burden of a recession is spread across
workers rather than being concentrated
among a few. Loss of a job often leads
to the loss not only of income but also
of key benefits, such as health insurance.
A substantial body of research shows
that many workers who lose their jobs
during recessions experience significant
economic setbacks that persist long after
the economy has recovered. In addition,
by mitigating layoffs, STC benefits may
reduce adverse spillover effects on local
communities.

Interestingly, work-sharing was
common during the Great Depression
and earlier recessions in our country’s
history. Labor historians attribute the
decline in the use of work-sharing during
recessions—and companies’ increased
use of layoffs—to the introduction of
our current system of unemployment
insurance in the 1930s. In contrast,
work-sharing has been institutionalized
in other Western developed countries.
In Germany, for example, STC was
incorporated into the unemployment
insurance system in the 1920s. During
recessions, German companies have
been much more likely than U.S.
companies to adjust workers’ hours
rather than engage in layoffs. Studies of
cross-country differences in adjustment
practices have documented the important
role STC can play in supporting worksharing arrangements during recessions
(Abraham and Houseman 1993, 1994).
Between 1975 and 1992, 19 states
implemented STC programs as part of
their unemployment insurance systems,
though two states subsequently rescinded
these policies and no state has added
a permanent STC program since the
early 1990s. Balducchi and Wandner
(2008) attribute this policy stalemate
to the “administrative muddle” created
by a lack of leadership in the federal
government. In 1992, questions were
raised about the federal law that enables
states to adopt STC programs, creating
uncertainty about what states are allowed
to do. This uncertainty has never been
resolved. Absent clear guidance, states
with STC programs have operated them
in a legal limbo, and other states that
might be interested in adopting programs
have been discouraged from doing
so. Even where programs exist, they
typically are not widely advertised, and
the procedures employers must follow to

put workers on short-time benefits tend to
be cumbersome, potentially discouraging
use.
Despite these barriers, there is
considerable anecdotal evidence that
in recent months employers have been
making greater use of STC in states
where it is available. In Connecticut,
for example, the number of employers
using STC increased from about 70 a
year ago to 330 in June, while in Oregon
the number of employers using STC
spiked from about 40 to 600 over the
same time period, according to the states’
UI program administrators. With greater
public support, work-sharing could be
considerably more prevalent, benefiting
both employers and working Americans.
In his inaugural address, President
Obama praised workers who “would
rather cut their hours than see a friend
lose their job.” Yet, state and federal
policy is biased in favor of layoffs over
work-sharing. Now is an opportune time
for the administration to implement
policies to facilitate the adoption of STC
in state unemployment insurance systems
and correct this bias.
References
Abraham, Katharine G., and Susan
N. Houseman. 1993. Job Security in
America: Lessons from Germany.
Washington, DC: The Brookings
Institution.
———. 1994. “Does Employment
Protection Inhibit Labor Market
Flexibility? Lessons from Germany,
France, and Belgium.” In Social
Protection versus Economic Flexibility:
Is There a Trade-Off? Rebecca M. Blank,
ed. Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
pp. 59–93.
Balducchi, David E., and Stephen
A. Wandner. 2008. “Work Sharing
Policy: Power Sharing and Stalemate
in American Federalism.” Publius
38(Winter): 111–136.
Katharine G. Abraham is a professor
of survey methodology at the University of
Maryland. Susan N. Houseman is a senior
economist at the Upjohn Institute.
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Timothy J. Bartik

The New Jobs Tax Credit:
A Tested Way to Fight
High Unemployment
T

he $787 billion economic
stimulus was justified by its benefits
for job creation. It is therefore curious
that stimulus programs do not directly
target job creation. Job creation is only
accomplished as a byproduct of reducing
taxes or building bridges. But job
creation is more effectively accomplished
by directly targeting these goals.
One policy that should be considered
for fighting high national or regional
unemployment is a revised version of the
New Jobs Tax Credit (NJTC), used by the
federal government in 1977–1978. The
NJTC provided a tax credit to businesses
for additions to their overall employment.
The wage subsidy was equivalent, in
2008 dollars, to a little over $7,000 per
additional worker per year. The program
at its peak provided such subsidies to 1.1
million businesses for adding more than
2.1 million workers, at an annual cost
of a little less than $4 billion, which, in
today’s dollars, is around $13 billion.
Note that the NJTC only provided
the credit for a business’s net additions
to its employment over some baseline
level, not for all new hires. Subsidizing
all new hires would encourage businesses
to lay off workers and then hire to fill the
vacancy, an undesirable incentive.
Some studies suggest that the
1977–1978 NJTC significantly increased
employment. Perloff and Wachter’s
(1979) estimates imply that one-third of
the jobs subsidized by the 1977–1978
NJTC were induced by this incentive;
two-thirds of the jobs subsidized by
the 1977–1978 NJTC would have
been created without the subsidy. It is
difficult with any subsidy to avoid some
deadweight loss from subsidizing actions
that would have been taken without the
subsidy.

The result is that an NJTC creates
new jobs—above what would have been
created without the credit—at a cost, in
2008 dollars, of about $20,000 per new
job. This is far cheaper per job created
than the recent economic stimulus.
In May of 2009, the White House
estimated that the cost per job created
of the economic stimulus will be around
$92,000.
In my 2001 book Jobs for the
Poor: Can Labor Demand Policies
Help? (Bartik 2001, chaps. 8 and 10) I
suggest some possible design features
of a revised NJTC to make it more
effective. First, the credit would be
made refundable. This makes the credit
more relevant to businesses that are less
profitable. Second, the credit would apply
to any employer that pays Social Security
taxes. This would include many small
and medium-sized businesses that do not
file corporate income taxes. This would
also include nonprofit organizations.
Studies suggest that wage subsidies are
more effective for smaller employers,
who face greater financing constraints.
Including nonprofit organizations means
the program would in part create public
service jobs, as well as jobs in for-profit
businesses.
I estimate that in today’s economy, a
revised NJTC might increase aggregate
U.S. employment by about 1.3 million
jobs per year (Bartik 2008). This is
the net increase in jobs, compared to
what these employers would have done
without this tax credit; the gross number
of subsidized jobs would be greater. In
addition, there would be some multiplier
effects on job creation of spending
additional funds. Therefore, total job
creation would likely be greater than 1.3
million jobs. The estimated annual budget
cost of this revised tax credit would be
$26 billion.

President Obama proposed a smaller
NJTC, perhaps $3,000 per job created,
during his 2008 campaign. This proposal
was not well received on Capitol Hill
and was dropped from the final stimulus
package. Some liberals were concerned
about providing additional tax breaks to
business with no guarantees of results,
while some conservatives were concerned
about attaching government conditions to
tax breaks for business.
However, research suggests a revised
NJTC is worth serious consideration.
Creating over a million jobs at less
than $20,000 per job is quite an
accomplishment. Even if a revised NJTC
proves somewhat less effective, it might
be superior to many fiscal stimulus
measures.
The social benefits to reducing
unemployment are great in a high
unemployment economy. Some version
of the NJTC should be considered as part
of the response to high unemployment.
References
Bartik, Timothy J. 2001. Jobs for the
Poor: Can Labor Demand Policies Help?
New York: Russell Sage Foundation;
Kalamazoo, MI: W.E. Upjohn Institute.
(Available from the Russell Sage
Foundation.)
———. 2008. “The U.S. Economic
Crisis and a Revised New Jobs Tax
Credit.” Upjohn Institute memo, October
16. Kalamazoo, MI: W.E. Upjohn
Institute. http://www.upjohn.org/bartiknjtc-proposal.pdf.
Perloff, Jeffrey M., and Michael L.
Wachter. 1979. “The New Jobs Tax
Credit: An Evaluation of the 1977–78
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Randall W. Eberts

Improving Performance
Measures for the
Nation’s Workforce
Development System
T

he current recession has reached
such depth and length that millions of
people have been thrown out of work.
Since the recession officially began in
December 2007, some 7 million jobs
have been lost. The large numbers of
people looking for work have placed
a tremendous burden on the nation’s
workforce development system. To help
people find jobs, the American Recovery
and Reinvestment Act of 2009 has more
than doubled the appropriations for
programs to assist dislocated workers,
disadvantaged adults, and youth from
the amount appropriated in the 2009
budget. These services are critical to the
economy’s recovery: they help workers
get back to work by assisting them in the
job-search process and in retooling their
skills. For the recovery effort to work,
all entities that have a responsibility
for these programs—federal, state, and
local—must implement them quickly and
effectively. Yet it is not enough simply
to spend money and enroll participants.
Rather, the services need to be effective
at getting people into decent-paying jobs.
How do we know whether this goal
is being accomplished and the money is
being spent effectively? For years, the
U.S. Department of Labor has recognized
the importance of accountability and
transparency by establishing performance
measures as an integral part of the federal
workforce system. Under the Workforce
Investment Act (WIA), which governs
the current federal workforce training
system, the Employment and Training
Administration (ETA)—the entity within
the U.S. Department of Labor responsible
for WIA—established three performance
measures: 1) entered employment, 2) job

retention, and 3) earnings levels. Each
state negotiates with the U.S. Department
of Labor to set standards, and, in turn,
each local Workforce Investment Board
(WIB) negotiates with the state to
determine its performance targets.

Yet it is not enough simply
to spend money and enroll
participants. Rather, the services
need to be effective at getting
people into decent-paying jobs.
As this practice of setting standards
evolved, states and WIBs increasingly
found that negotiations were not taking
into account factors that affected their
performance but were beyond their
control and unrelated to the services
they provided. These factors include the
conditions of the local labor market and
the personal characteristics and work
history of participants in their programs.
Without accounting for differences in
these factors across states and across
WIBs, those entities with more favorable
labor market conditions or more capable
participants are likely to have higher
outcomes, and those for which these
factors are unfavorable can expect lower
outcomes. As a result, differences in these
outcomes will not reflect the true “valueadded” of service providers in improving
outcomes for their customers, but instead
will reflect the mix of customers and
labor market conditions facing those
customers.
Therefore, a concern that quickly
surfaced in implementing the Recovery
Act funding was whether or not the
targets, if set unrealistically high,
would discourage states and WIBs from

enrolling those individuals who needed
the services the most. Recently the
ETA has responded to this concern by
adjusting the targets at the national level
to take into account the effect of higher
unemployment rates on the performance
measures. Since WIA was implemented
in 1998, targets have been set higher for
each successive program year, raising the
bar for performance without adjusting the
targets for changes in the business cycle.
However, the depth of this recession
has prompted the ETA to establish a
target-setting procedure that is objective,
transparent, and reflective of current
conditions. It does this by estimating
the effect of changes in unemployment
rates on the three performance measures
and then using that estimate to adjust
performance standards according
to the assumptions for next year’s
unemployment rates as presented in
the President’s 2010 Budget Request to
Congress. These adjusted performance
targets in turn affect the targets at the
state and local levels, but still do so
through negotiations.
The next step is to extend this
objective procedure of setting national
targets to setting targets for states
and WIBs. This will require adding
the effect of differences in personal
characteristics to the effect of differences
in unemployment rates in order to
calculate the adjustments. A procedure
similar to the one proposed here was
used under the Job Training Partnership
Act, the immediate predecessor to WIA.
Implementing such a target-setting
procedure will move the performance
measures closer to reflecting the valueadded of the services provided by
workforce development programs rather
than simply recording the effects of all
factors (many of which are extraneous to
the services) on a worker’s employment
outcomes. Such a performance system
will help to lessen adverse incentives
to “cream-skim” the enrollment of
customers, a practice that works against
providing services to those who need
them most in these difficult economic
times.
Randall W. Eberts is president of the Upjohn
Institute.
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Randall W. Eberts and Christopher J. O’Leary

Tools to Transform
the Workforce
Development System
T

he American Recovery and
Reinvestment Act of 2009 is intended
to preserve and create jobs, promote the
nation’s economic recovery, and assist
those most affected by the recession. The
Recovery Act recognizes the urgency
of getting assistance to laid-off workers
and injecting money into the economy
as quickly as possible. It also sees this
economic crisis as an opportunity to
invest for the future, not only in the
private sector but also in upgrading and
transforming the way in which public
services are delivered.
Several federal agencies have stepped
up to this challenge. One is the U.S.
Department of Labor (USDOL), which
has identified a number of areas in
which the integration of management
information systems with statistical
analyses could transform the workforce
delivery system into an evidence-based
performance system. At present, the
department has developed stand-alone
programs which could be much more
effective, in our opinion, if they were
expanded to be more comprehensive and
integrated.
Since 1996, USDOL has used
a statistical model to identify
Unemployment Insurance (UI)
beneficiaries who are most likely to
exhaust their benefits. Referred to as the
Worker Profiling and Reemployment
Services (WPRS) system, its purpose
is to encourage UI claimants to use
reemployment services intensively at the
beginning of their unemployment spell
rather than toward the end, when they
face the prospect of being cut off. The
procedure is simple. A statistical analysis
is performed by each state to estimate the
effect of various factors—education, prior
employment history, and so forth—on
the probability of exhausting benefits. UI

claimants whose characteristics suggest
that they have a high probability of using
up their benefits before finding a job are
required to attend orientation and register
for reemployment services right away.
Evaluations show that WPRS reduces the
use of UI benefits.
WPRS offers a solid foundation for
developing a more integrated system that
brings together information from all the
workforce development programs and
combines them with decision-making
algorithms based on empirical evidence
of what services work best for specific
groups of individuals. Encouraged by the
success of WPRS, the Upjohn Institute,
with financial support from USDOL,
developed a more comprehensive
evidence-based management system,
referred to as the Frontline Decision
Support System (FDSS). FDSS consists
of a set of tools that can help frontline
staff at One-Stop Career Centers make
better decisions regarding the services
to which they refer their customers.
For example, for dislocated workers,
FDSS offers a systematic sequence of
steps they can use to move through
the reemployment process, beginning
with understanding their likelihood of
returning to work in the same industry,
proceeding to exploring job prospects in
occupations that require similar skills and
aptitudes, then to accessing information
about the earnings and growth of jobs
in particular occupations within their
local labor market, and ending with an
understanding of which reemployment
and training services work best for them,
if none of the previous steps leads to a
job. The tools are based on statistical
relationships between a customer’s
employment outcomes, personal
characteristics, and other factors that may
affect his or her outcomes, all of which
are available from administrative files

already collected by the various agencies.
The statistical algorithms provide an
evidence-based approach to determining
which services are most effective for
specific individuals.
By using administrative data that
captures the experience of all customers
who have participated in the workforce
system, this evidence-based approach
offers a more comprehensive “collective”
experience of what works and what
doesn’t than relying on the narrower
experience of individual caseworkers. In
addition, FDSS incorporates local labor
market information and data about job
requirements and available openings,
so that most information pertinent
to a person’s job search is available
in a comprehensive and systematic
framework. Implementation of such a
system also helps to develop a culture
of management by evidence within the
workforce development system.
The Georgia Department of Labor
incorporated FDSS into its existing
operating system at two pilot sites
during 2001. It demonstrated that
integrated systems can be developed and
implemented, and the positive feedback
from frontline staff and customers speaks
to its potential.
With the Recovery Act’s emphasis on
transforming the workforce development
system and the dire need of workers
in this current recession to receive
the most effective services possible
to help them return to work, this is
an opportune time to take advantage
of past accomplishments and current
technologies to build a stronger, more
integrated one-stop service delivery
system for the nation’s workers.
Visit http://www.upjohninstitute.org/
targeting.html for more information on
WPRS and FDSS.
Randall W. Eberts is president of the
Upjohn Institute, and Christopher J. O’Leary
is a senior economist at the Institute.
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Timothy J. Bartik

Adding Labor Demand
Incentives to Encourage
Employment for
the Disadvantaged
E

ven after the U.S. economy
recovers, there are likely to be
considerable long-term employment
problems for the disadvantaged. For
example, even in 2006, when the U.S.
economy was near a business cycle peak,
employment rates for less-educated male
workers were still well below where
they were 30 years ago. To match lesseducated male employment rates from
1979, the United States in 2006 would
have needed to add about 3 million jobs
(Bartik and Houseman 2008). In addition,
employment rates of less-educated
unmarried women in 2006 were still well
below those of men, even though under
welfare reform these women are expected
to work and be self-supporting.
In addition to finding ways of
expanding job training programs and
improving educational attainment, we
need approaches to expanding labor
demand for disadvantaged workers.
Studies have shown that if disadvantaged
workers can be hired for entry-level
jobs and stay employed for at least six
months, they gain valuable labor market
experience, self-confidence, and a better
reputation with employers, all of which
increase their long-term employability
and earnings.
In my 2001 book Jobs for the
Poor: Can Labor Demand Policies
Help? (Bartik 2001, chaps. 8 and
10) I suggest that the United States
establish a permanent version of a
program that Minnesota tried in the
1980s, the MEED program. MEED at
first stood for Minnesota Emergency
Employment Development, and later for
Minnesota Employment and Economic
Development.

Under my proposed national version
of MEED, the federal government would
provide wage subsidies of up to $8 an
hour for employers who hire unemployed
workers referred by local workforce
agencies for newly created positions.
For several reasons, the program would
be a discretionary program administered
by local workforce agencies. First, this
would allow the program to be integrated
with local workforce programs. Second,
a discretionary program could be
selective in targeting employers who
would be most willing to offer good job
experiences to disadvantaged workers.
Third, a discretionary program could
target disadvantaged workers who
would be good matches for interested
employers, which would increase the
effectiveness of the program.
The subsidies would go to newly
created positions to minimize
displacement. This program is intended
to increase total employment rather than
to substitute disadvantaged workers for
other workers.
The wage subsidies would target
small businesses and small nonprofit
employers. The evidence suggests that
these smaller employers may be the most
responsive to a wage subsidy. Including
both for-profit and nonprofit employers
also allows the program to provide a wide
variety of job experiences, and to provide
both private and public services.
The wage subsidies would fund up to
six months of labor market experience.
Employers would be encouraged to roll
over those hired into permanent job slots.
Employers that abused the wage subsidy
system would be excluded from future
subsidies.
Evidence from the MEED program
suggests that such a program can

be successfully run on a large scale.
Furthermore, studies find that about
half of the jobs subsidized would not
have been created but for MEED. The
program was run in Minnesota on a scale
that would be equivalent to having about
600,000 annual participants on a national
level (Rode 1988).
A program run at a similar level
nationally in the United States might
cost about $8 billion a year. This would
include both the cost of the wage
subsidy and the costs of various types
of job training and social support for
disadvantaged workers who are hired.
The long-term effects of this program
should be regularly monitored through
a performance-monitoring system. This
system would track the postprogram
employment and earnings history of
program participants, compared to similar
nonparticipants.
The research literature on wage
subsidies suggests that such a program
may have long-term effects. Perhaps
20 percent of the extra employment
experience of program participants in
the short run is likely to be reflected in
increases in long-term employment rates
of program participants. If run over a
sustained period, this program has the
potential to make a substantial dent
in the depressed employment rates of
disadvantaged groups.
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Why Universal Preschool
Is Really a Labor Market
Program
W

here is the biggest economic
bang for the buck in investing in
education? Arguably the best educational
investment would be in high-quality, halfday preschool that would be universally
accessible to all four-year-olds. The
available research evidence suggests that
such an investment would increase U.S.
earnings far more than it would cost.
Such a program would help children from
middle-class families, but it would also
provide far more dramatic assistance
in increasing the eventual earnings of
children from low-income families.
Unlike many educational investments,
there is rigorous evidence on the longterm effects of high-quality preschool.
The data come from studies of two
programs: the Perry Preschool Program
in Ypsilanti, Michigan, and the Chicago
Child-Parent Center Program. These
studies provide strong evidence that highquality preschool can change a child’s
life course. For example, research on
Perry found that former child participants
in the program earn 60 percent more
in monthly income than their Ypsilanti
control-group peers who did not attend
preschool. Similarly, CPC increases the
number of youth completing high school
by more than one-fifth.
Because preschool increases
educational attainment, employment
rates, and wage rates, it should be viewed
as a labor market program. Preschool
works on the supply side of the labor
market. By resulting in future increases in
both hard skills and soft skills of former
preschool participants, it increases the
quantity and quality of the U.S. labor
supply. These boosts to labor supply will
improve labor market outcomes.
Research also suggests what elements
are essential in defining “high quality”
for preschool. The lead teacher must be

paid adequately. Preschool group size
must be kept to no more than 20 children
to 2 teachers, and preferably 17 children
or less, with 2 teachers. Staff training
improves quality. And high-quality
curricula that encourage more individual
attention and development of children
make a difference as well.

A high-quality, half-day
preschool program for fouryear-olds produces great
benefits for the economy.
Furthermore, research suggests that
the greatest benefit-cost ratio is for a halfday, school-year program for four-yearolds. Doubling the hours per day from
three to six leads to increased benefits,
but not double the benefits. Preschool
at age three in addition to age four also
increases benefits, but does not double
benefits.
Studies I have conducted (Bartik
2006, 2008) suggest that a high-quality,
half-day preschool program for fouryear-olds produces great benefits for
the economy. Per dollar spent, such a
program will increase the present value
of earnings by $4—a four-to-one return
on investment. Most of these effects
are from the increased earnings of the
former child participants in the programs.
However, there also are some benefits
from increasing the labor supply of
parents through providing free child care
at preschool, and from creating jobs for
preschool teachers and administrators.
My simulations further suggest that
a universal preschool program will
particularly benefit the poor but will also
benefit the middle class. The earnings
benefits per capita from universal
preschool are estimated to be 10 times as
great for the lowest-income quintile as

for the middle-income quintile. But the
middle-income quintile still gains almost
$3 in increased earnings for every dollar
of tax cost paid for universal preschool.
A high-quality, half-day universal
preschool program for four-year-olds
would cost about $20 billion annually if
implemented in all states. To encourage
flexibility and creativity, it might be wise
to allow considerable state and local
discretion in the design of preschool
programs. However, the federal
government could play a useful role in
encouraging expansion of high-quality
preschool programs, while promoting
learning about the most effective
approaches. Federal matching funds could
encourage state and local governments
to expand preschool programs. Federal
funding could particularly focus on
staff training, high-quality curricula,
infrastructure and materials, and regular
data collection of results, all of which
would contribute to high quality in
preschool. The federal government also
could pay for ongoing studies that would
likely further increase our knowledge
of what works in preschool. However,
the federal government should avoid
micromanaging preschool design. Much
of the recent innovation in preschool
programs has come from new state
programs. Continued state and local
experimentation and innovation should be
encouraged.
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Kevin Hollenbeck

Boosting the Economy
through Career and
Technical Education
U

nited States educational policy
has become accountability-driven, with
outcomes almost exclusively measured
by results on standardized tests of
mathematics and language arts. The
national consensus seems to be that we
need to increase achievement levels
and reduce the test-score gaps between
groups. These goals are laudatory
and should be pursued. However, a
strengthened educational system must
still accommodate high-quality career
and technical education at the secondary
and postsecondary levels. U.S. workers,
and in particular workers in states such as
Michigan that have a strong tradition in
manufacturing, need to increase skills in
response to a changing industrial mix and
competition from abroad.
Traditionally, secondary career and
technical education (CTE, formerly
referred to as vocational education) has
focused on career preparation with the
notion that students, if they so chose,
could pursue a career immediately after
high school. With technological changes
and global competition, that option
has virtually closed. But rather than
end these programs at the secondary
level, educators should continue to
offer CTE for its pedagogical value of
imparting general skills that all workers
need (see, for example, the first three
tiers of the framework presented at
the U.S. Department of Labor’s Web
page http://www.careeronestop.org/
CompetencyModel/Info_Documents/
Advanced-Manufacturing.pdf). To ensure
rigor, all secondary CTE courses need
to be articulated with postsecondary
curricula.
At the postsecondary level, the United
States should allocate adequate resources
to ensure that students receive up-todate, rigorous, employer-driven career
preparation. This preparation would,

for the most part, occur at community
colleges. These institutions have
exhibited the flexibility necessary to
deliver education in diverse modalities.
Apprenticeships are an excellent vehicle
for imparting formal training and should
be expanded as much as is practical.
Part of the investment of public funds in
these institutions may need to be directed
into developmental education for either
students coming directly from high
school or older individuals reentering
formal education who have basic skills
deficits. Part of the investment may be in
technology and equipment. The nation’s
two educational objectives should be 1)
that an applied associate’s degree or skill
certification should carry, explicitly or
implicitly, a “money-back” guarantee to
an employer that the holder of the degree/
certificate has the general and specific
skills to be a productive employee, and
2) that an associate’s degree or skill
certification should be the minimum level
of education sought for all adults.
Can the United States afford to
increase its investment in secondary
and, especially, postsecondary CTE?
Will society and students benefit from
such an investment? In studies that use
administrative data from the states of
Washington, Virginia, and Indiana, I have
estimated substantial positive earnings
and employment gains of secondary CTE,
postsecondary CTE, and apprenticeships
for participants. And from a public

finance perspective, benefits in the form
of increased tax revenues and decreased
public assistance payments far exceed the
public costs of providing the program.
For example, Hollenbeck and Huang
(2006) report (discounted) working
lifetime benefits-to-cost ratios for the
government of 10.37, 1.98, and 18.47
for secondary CTE, community-college
and technical-college job preparation
programs, and apprenticeships,
respectively (see Table 1).
In short, several studies have shown
substantial positive earnings and
employment impacts for high school
CTE. Furthermore, studies done by
Upjohn Institute researchers have shown
that subbaccalaureate degree programs
and apprenticeships have extremely
high rates of return for individuals and
for state governments. In the zeal to
promote mathematics and language arts
achievement and accountability, it would
be a mistake to weaken curriculum and
instruction in CTE. On the contrary, this
type of education warrants increased
investment.
Reference
Hollenbeck, Kevin, and Wei-Jang
Huang. 2006. Net Impact and BenefitCost Estimates of the Workforce
Development System in Washington
State. Upjohn Institute Technical Report
06-020. Kalamazoo, MI: W.E. Upjohn
Institute.
Note
For more proposals on education and
training, see chapters by Robert Lerman
and Paul Osterman in A Future of Good
Jobs? America’s Challenge in the Global
Economy, 2008. W.E. Upjohn Institute.
Kevin Hollenbeck is vice president and a
senior economist at the Upjohn Institute.

Table 1 Benefits and Costs to the Government of Selected Education Programs in the State
of Washington over a Short-Term Payoff Period and over a Working Lifetime
Short-term
Program

Working lifetime

Benefits ($)

Costs ($)

Benefits ($)

Costs ($)

749

811

8,414

811

Community college job prep

3,967

7,523

14,873

7,523

Apprenticeship

5,353

2,668

49,288

2,668

Secondary CTE

NOTE: Table entries are for average participant. Benefits include income and sales tax receipts
and reduced transfer payments discounted at 3.0 percent. Costs include public subsidies of
program costs. $ figures are in real $2005/2006. Short-term is 2.5 years after graduation/exit.
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D) Demonstrate capacity for
innovation. Firms that employ engineers
and designers have a greater probability
of continuously providing what the global
economy wants and, in doing so, of
keeping the area’s workforce employed.

How Can a Community
Respond to the
Economic Downturn?
M

any communities are being hit
with major layoffs because of the current
recession. For the lucky ones, most of the
eliminated jobs will return as the global
economy recovers. However, evidence
suggests that many local economies,
especially those with strong ties to the
Detroit Three automakers, will suffer
long-term negative effects from this
current recession.
The effectiveness of a community’s
response depends both upon factors that
are within its control and on ones that
are clearly outside its control, including
simple luck. In short, there is no one clear
strategy that fits all areas and guarantees
success. Nevertheless, recent research
activities at the Upjohn Institute support
the following three-faceted approach.
1. Replace Products, Not Workers
Three macro factors influence a
community’s economic future: 1)
technological change, 2) global demand,
and 3) regional structure (Figure 1). A
regions’s structure is determined by its
industry mix, competitiveness, amenities,
and the ability to innovate. Too often,
local economic developers determine
their economic targets by moving overly
quickly to identify opportunities where
new technologies interact with global
demand. The clearest example of this
approach (which we call “rounding up
the usual suspects”) is life sciences—a
field popular because of its growth rate
and high-wage occupations, but not a
good fit for every community.
Such a strategy ignores what W.R.
Thompson (1965, p. 3) calls “the very
essence of long-run growth,” which is
to adapt what you know to what the
changing world economy needs. A more
fruitful strategy would be to identify new
technologies, products, or markets for the

3. Success Takes Time and Trust

area’s existing companies and workforce.
An example of this could be to assist a
threatened auto supplier in making wind
turbine components.
2. Build from Strengths
In times of crisis, community
economic development stakeholders too
often focus on their area’s weaknesses.
A more productive community strategy
is to build from strengths and identify
industries that can do the following:
A) Draw upon the existing regional
economic base for either suppliers or
customers. Firms in industries that draw
upon the base have the potential to create
new jobs while shoring up existing
jobs. Moreover, new companies that are
integrated into the local economy have
a great potential for generating sizable
overall income impacts.
B) Provide jobs that are within reach
of affected local workers. Economic
developers should try to improve the
well-being of residents, not just bring in
workers from outside the region.
C) Show good growth potential
regionally and nationally.

Finally, many of the more successful
economic development efforts in the
country are found in communities that
share the following attributes:
A) A stable and well-respected
economic development staff. Longevity
matters in building trust and partnerships
in a local community. Economic
development requires risk-taking by
private investors, which can only be
undertaken in an atmosphere of trust.
B) Focus. Identified projects should
be focused on tapping into the region’s
strengths and potential.
C) Support from private investment.
Private investors can respond more
quickly than public agencies and can
build more effective partnerships.
D) A regional strategy. A regional
approach can overcome barriers caused
by fragmented interest groups or
competing geographical concerns.
Reference
Thompson, W.R. 1965. A Preface
to Urban Economics. Baltimore: Johns
Hopkins University Press.
George A. Erickcek is senior regional analyst
and Brad R. Watts is regional analyst, both at
the Upjohn Institute. This article is based on a
forthcoming Upjohn Institute working paper.

Figure 1 Possible Economic Development Strategies for Local Areas
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The Kalamazoo Promise
as a Model for an
American Promise
T

here is general agreement that the
United States would gain great economic
benefits from significantly increasing
the educational and skills attainment of
its citizens. Even with large increases in
the relative wages of college-educated
workers to others, the percentage of
Americans with college degrees has not
dramatically increased.
Increased educational attainment
would raise wages considerably for those
who acquired more education. It would
also help reduce income inequality by
increasing the relative wages of the lesseducated versus the educated. There also
is noteworthy evidence of productivity
spillovers from more education: local
labor markets with a greater percentage
of more-educated workers have higher
average wages for all workers. This may
reflect a greater ability of employers to
introduce more advanced production
techniques when workers have more
skills.
Not everyone needs a college degree.
There is considerable evidence of
healthy demand for workers possessing
middle-level skills and having either an
associate’s degree from a community
college or an occupational certification.
But in today’s world economy, the U.S.
labor market would probably benefit
from ensuring that all Americans get
a postsecondary education or skills
certification that leads to a productive and
decent-paying career.
Despite the economic need for skills,
the United States does not currently
seem to have an effective strategy
for increasing postsecondary skills
acquisition. There is little evidence that
No Child Left Behind, a standards-based
approach to improving K-12 education,
has led to dramatic increases in skills
acquisition. And despite plenty of rhetoric

advocating increasing college access for
all, college financial aid has not kept pace
with the rising costs of college.
The Kalamazoo Promise provides one
possible model for the United States to
break with this pattern of a high ratio of
rhetoric to reform in educational policy.
The Promise provides all graduates
of Kalamazoo Public Schools (KPS)
who attended KPS at least since 9th
grade with 65 percent or more of the
tuition for attending a public university
or community college in Michigan.
Kalamazoo Public Schools graduates
who attended since kindergarten get 100
percent of their tuition paid.
This program, guaranteed by its
private donors to be available for many
years to come, aims in part to enable
more KPS graduates to go to college.
But it also intends to change student and
parent attitudes. The Promise allows
all KPS students and their families to
know that they will be able to afford to
go to college. It signals to those students
and their families that the Kalamazoo
community expects them to pursue
postsecondary education. The hope is
that these changes in expectations and
attitudes will improve students’ behavior
and academic achievement.
Does the Kalamazoo Promise work?
The results are not yet in on this social
experiment. There are some signs that
the Promise has increased graduation
rates of African American KPS students,
and there is no doubt that it has also
significantly increased enrollment in
KPS and stabilized the school district’s
racial balance. In terms of the regional
economy, George Erickcek, senior
regional analyst at the Upjohn Institute,
computed a forecast of the impact of
the Kalamazoo Promise. Using very
conservative assumptions that take
into account displacement effects,

he projected a regional net growth
in employment of more than 2,200
persons per year within 12 years of its
implementation in 2006, and a net growth
in personal income of about $140 million
per year.
Could the Kalamazoo Promise provide
a model for an American Promise? In
fact, Michigan has already shown the
way with the creation of Promise Zones
in ten communities across the state.
Like the Kalamazoo Promise, these
initiatives unite the goals of education
and economic development. They also
suggest that the state’s troubled economy
is yielding innovations that can provide a
model for the nation.
A national model of the Kalamazoo
Promise might guarantee that all students
would receive sufficient tuition support
to readily afford two years of college or
an apprenticeship program. An American
Promise could help move the United
States from a system of K-12 for all
to one of K-14 for all. It would send a
clear signal to all American families that
postsecondary education is possible, and
indeed expected. Beyond this signal, it
would provide an incentive for families,
students, and educators to increase
expectations and achievement in earlier
school years.
Timothy J. Bartik is a senior economist at
the Upjohn Institute. Michelle Miller-Adams
is an assistant professor of political science at
Grand Valley State University and a visiting
scholar at the Upjohn Institute.
“Michelle MillerAdams captures the
truly unique story of
the Kalamazoo Promise
without losing sight of
the universal lessons it
offers us. [This book]
is essential reading
for anyone who wants
to understand the
future of economic
and community development in our country.”
–Governor Jennifer M. Granholm, State of
Michigan
To order this book, see the back page of this
newsletter, call 1-888-227-8569, or visit
http://www.upjohninstitute.org.
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